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# The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer  
by Victor Marchetti.  
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnett

adventurer has passed in the American the  
spy business; the bureaucratic age of ingt  
Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- kno  
cialists has settled in." I began to have fina  
an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* ingt  
article was a cover story in more than vote  
one sense. An

It has always been difficult to faille  
analyze organizations that engage in A  
false advertising about themselves. Part of i  
of the responsibility of the CIA is to larly  
spread confusion about its own work. the  
The world of Richard Helms and his beca  
"specialists" does indeed differ from ized  
that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ- Hel  
izations, in spite of their predilection over  
for what English judges used to call ligen  
"frolics of their own," are servants of Age  
policy. When policy changes, they Bur  
must eventually change too, although the  
because of the atmosphere of secrecy cen  
and deception in which they operate, ove:  
such changes are exceptionally hard to vice  
control. To understand the "new Age  
espionage" one must see it as part of imp  
the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, Th  
is a global strategy for maintaining US  
power and influence without overtly reo:  
involving the nation in another ground Hel  
war. nev

But we cannot comprehend recent lige  
developments in the "intelligence com- nev  
munity" without understanding what fur  
Mr. Helms and his employees actually Pre  
do. In a speech before the National me  
Press Club, the director discouraged w  
journalists from making the attempt. de  
"You've just got to trust us. We are no  
honorable men." The same speech is P.  
made each year to the small but  
growing number of senators who want h  
a closer check on the CIA. In asking, tl  
on November 10, for a "Select Com- c  
mittee on the Coordination of United n  
States Activities Abroad to oversee p  
activities of the Central Intelligence t  
Agency," Senator Stuart Symington p  
noted that "the subcommittee having A  
oversight of the Central Intelligence i  
Agency has not met once this year." t

Symington, a former Secretary of c  
the Air Force and veteran member of i  
the Armed Services Committee, has t  
also said that "there is no federal  
agency in our government whose activ- s  
ities receive less scrutiny and control  
than the CIA." Moreover, soon after  
Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

In late November the Central Intel-  
ligence Agency conducted a series of  
"senior seminars" so that some of its  
important bureaucrats could consider  
its public image. I was invited to  
attend one session and to give my  
views on the proper role of the  
Agency. I suggested that its legitimate  
activities were limited to studying  
newspapers and published statistics,  
listening to the radio, thinking about  
the world, interpreting data of recon-  
naissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I  
had been led by conversations with a  
number of CIA officials to believe that  
they were thinking along the same  
lines. One CIA man after another  
eagerly joined the discussion to assure  
me that the days of the flamboyant  
covert operations were over. The  
upper-class amateurs of the OSS who  
stayed to mastermind operations in  
Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else-  
where—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt,  
Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert  
Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died  
or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a  
small army of professionals devoted to  
preparing intelligence "estimates" for  
the President and collecting informa-  
tion the clean, modern way, mostly  
with sensors, computers, and sophis-  
ticated reconnaissance devices. Even  
Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now  
be as much a museum piece as Mata  
Hari. (There are about 18,000 em-  
ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the  
entire "intelligence community" itself.  
The cost of maintaining them is some-  
where between \$5 billion and \$6  
billion annually. The employment  
figures do not include foreign agents or  
mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-  
man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior  
seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story  
on "the new espionage" with a picture  
of CIA Director Richard Helms on the  
cover. The reporter, *Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100070001-9*  
to some of the same people I had. As  
*Newsweek* said, "The gaudy era of the

## LETTERS

## Secrets from the CIA

Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR SIR: With the exposure of the papers from the Media, Pa. FBI office last spring, the investigation of Army surveillance activities, and finally the publication of the Pentagon Papers, the public has had an unparalleled opportunity to understand the similarity of the government's foreign and domestic covert action programs. The most sophisticated arm of the U.S. secret agency—the CIA—had, however, escaped public scrutiny until last month. Now major excerpts from a secret document which details the CIA's global strategies have been made public. The complete text of the document, "Intelligence and Foreign Policy," together with an introduction and other studies of the CIA's activities is available for \$1 (plus 25¢ for postage and handling) from the Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Africa Research Group

## Seeks Shift to 'Unofficial Cover'

# CIA Fears a Mass Exposure

STAT

By Chicago Sun-Times

WASHINGTON -- The Central Intelligence Agency has long feared the type of mass exposure that befell Soviet intelligence in Britain last week, a confidential report disclosed Monday.

The report shows that the CIA has been trying for several years to shift its espionage operations away from U. S. embassies and offices to "unofficial cover" -- private organizations and

businesses and "non-U. S. nationals."

It acknowledges that tough Russian security has forced the CIA to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union through "third-country" operations -- just as the Russians apparently were seeking intelligence on the United States through its spy apparatus in Britain.

THE REPORT, a copy of which has been obtained by The Chicago

Sun-Times, is based on a discussion among several former high-ranking intelligence officials conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Jan. 8, 1968.

Richard M. Bissell, former deputy director of the CIA and moderator of the discussion, has confirmed the authenticity of the report, which is headed: "Confidential: Not for publication. Restricted to group members only. Not to be quoted or cited."

THE PARTICIPANTS included Allen Dulles, the late director of the CIA; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Eugene Fubini, former assistant secretary of defense in the area of electronic intelligence; Thomas L. Hughes, former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Theodore Sorensen, special assistant to President Kennedy.

Although the report does not identify the source of various opinions and comments, Bissell appears to have been the main contributor.

"If the agency is to be effective," the report declares at one point, "it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale. . . CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected."

THE REPORT calls for "deeper cover" and "increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs'" defined in a footnote as "projects backed by the CIA which cannot be traced back to the CIA."

The report concedes that there are "powerful reasons" for concealing CIA agents within U. S. embassies, principally to provide safe means of communication to Washington.

"Nonetheless," it goes on, "it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U. S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U. S. posture."

THE REPORT suggested links with U. S. corporations which could make their own lines of communication available to CIA agents.

All 105 of the Russian officials expelled by Britain last Friday were under "official cover," operating out of the Soviet embassy or trade mission. As such they were much more susceptible to British counterintelligence than "unofficial cover" agents such as those suggested in the Bissell

## RECORD OF '68 DISCUSSION

## The CIA Has "Cover" Problems, Too

By JAMES DOYLE

Star Staff Writer

Early in 1968 a group including former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department settled down after dinner at the Harold Pratt House, on New York's Avenue, to discuss some of the CIA's problems.

A record of their conversation shows that the particular concern of the group that night was how to provide a deeper cover for Americans gathering information by using non-governmental organizations as fronts.

The participants were members and guests of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations, men who seem to direct foreign policy from within and without the government on a permanent basis, and publishers of "Foreign Affairs," the quarterly bible of American diplomacy.

A record of the discussion at the council's headquarters on that evening, Jan. 8, 1968, has been circulated to some newspapers by a group of self-styled radical scholars based in Cambridge.

It portrays with some new details the structure and the style of the American intelligence community. The document is timely in the wake of events last week in London, where 105 members of the Soviet community there, including employees from the Soviet embassy, trade delegation, tourist agency, Moscow Narodny Bank and Aeroflot Airline were uncovered as espionage agents, and banned from the country without replacements.

It was a fear of just such an incident, apparently, that dominated the conversation at Pratt House that night.

The U.S. "employees" whose cover constantly is endangered, the participants felt, are those who work in the American Embassies, trade delegations, and other U.S. agencies in countries around the world.

Richard Bissell, a former deputy director of the CIA who left the agency after the Bay of Pigs debacle, led the discussion. According to the record made available to The Star, he told his council colleagues that CIA

agents "need to operate under deeper cover."

Bissell recounted ruefully the uproar over the CIA's exposed funding of the National Student Association's overseas activities and said, "The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied."

He noted that the problems of American spies overseas "is frequently a problem of the State Department."

"It tends to be true that local allies find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American—since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee," Bissell is reported to have said.

"There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the embassy compound, if only for local 'command post' and communications requirements.

"Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover," Bissell is quoted as saying.

"This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture."

## Use Non-Americans

Bissell said that the United States needed to increase its use of non-Americans for espionage "with an effort at indoctrination and training: they should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff."

He added that as intelligence efforts shifted more toward Latin America, Asia and Africa, "the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover."

... The CIA might be able to make use of non-nationals as 'carcer agents', that is with a status midway between that for the classical agent used in a

and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations, and well informed of the agency's capabilities."

An unidentified former State Department official responded to Bissell that he agreed with the need to change covers, noting that "the initial agreement between the agency and State was intended to be 'temporary', but nothing endures like the ephemeral."

Another participant noted that very little attention was paid to revelations of the CIA's use of supposedly independent operations such as "Radio Free Europe," he added, "One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at least not nearly so much as by the penetration of U.S. institutions."

This participant was quoted as saying, "The public doesn't think it's right; they don't know where it ends; they take a look at their neighbors." Then he asked whether "this suggested expansion in use of private institutions should include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions operating overseas?"

In response, clear distinctions were reportedly made between operating in the United States and abroad, and the suggestion was made by Bissell, "One might want CIA to expand its use of private U.S. corporations, but for objectives outside the United States."

## Fund Demands Rise

The record of the discussion did not link comment and author, but did give a general identification of the men present. There also was a diligent removal from the authorized reporter's transcript of all specific references of agents, incidents and the like, with one noticeable lapse.

In a discussion of the effect of revelations that the CIA was financing U.S. labor union activities abroad, it was noted that these disclosures had simply increased the demand for such funds from overseas labor groups.

... "The text says British Guiana labor unions

"were supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations to the contrary, there has been no damage."

Those present and taking part in the discussion included men who have journeyed back and forth between government and corporate work, most of whom have remained near the center of the foreign policy establishment.

They included Bissell, now an executive with United Aircraft Corp. in Hartford, Conn.; former Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon; former CIA director Allen Dulles; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Meyer Bernstein, director of international affairs for the United Steelworkers of America; columnist Joseph Kraft; former White House aide Theodore Sorensen of Kennedy and Johnson days; and Philip Quigg, recently resigned as managing editor of Foreign Affairs.

Facsimile copies of the discussion summary have been circulated by "The Africa Research Group," a dozen young scholars in Cambridge who take a radical dissenting view of U.S. foreign policy.

Reached at his home, Bissell confirmed the authenticity of the document.

He noted that in the discussion that night in New York, he had begun by saying that agent espionage was the least valuable of three main CIA missions, behind reconnaissance and electronic intelligence, the two areas where most CIA money is spent.

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POST-DISPATCH

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# Confidential Report Urges More Secrecy In CIA Spying

By RICHARD DUDMAN  
Chief Washington  
Correspondent of the  
Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Sept. 25.—A confidential report being circulated in Washington and Boston urges that the Central Intelligence Agency improve its secrecy in penetrating private institutions at home and abroad.

The document proposes also that the CIA direct its covert operations particularly at Africa, Asia and Latin America and make wide use of agents other than Americans.

The report is a summary of a panel discussion on intelligence and foreign policy conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York Jan. 8, 1968.

Copies of the document are being circulated in this country and Europe by a group of radical scholars in Cambridge, Mass., as "a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of the Central Intelligence Agency" and "a fair warning as to the direction of the agency's interests and efforts."

Leader of the 1968 discussion was Richard M. Bissell Jr., a former CIA deputy director who was in charge of the U-2 spy plane program in the late 1950s and the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. He left the Government in 1962 and is a vice president at United Aircraft Corp.

Others in the group were the late Allen W. Dulles, who had been the CIA director; Robert Amory Jr., who had been the deputy CIA director for intelligence; Thomas L. Hughes, then director of intelligence and research at the Department of State and now president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Meyer Bernstein, director of international affairs for the United Steel Workers of America.

mer Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dilloo was chairman.

The document, reporting Bissell's review and appraisal of the CIA's covert operations, said: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected.

"We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs.' CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected."

Bissell's presentation, as reported in the summary, referred frequently to exposes in the previous year of the CIA's penetration and financing of the National Student Association and other private organizations including trade union organizations overseas.

"If various groups hadn't been aware of the source of their funding, the damage subsequent to disclosure might have been far less than occurred," the summary said.

"The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied."

Other documents, obtained in early 1969 by the Post-Dispatch, showed that the U.S. Agency for International Development had picked up the tab for certain overseas programs that had been financed secretly by the CIA. These became known as "CIA orphans" after the secret financing was disclosed.

The change apparently grew out of a 1967 order by President Lyndon B. Johnson prohibiting any further hidden subsidies to private voluntary organizations. He promised to consider a proposal that the Federal Government establish "a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest."

As a result, AID funds have been used to finance in part certain international labor programs handled through ... the AFL-CIO.

One member of the 1968 panel, not identified but apparently Bernstein, the Steelworkers' officer, was quoted as saying that it was common knowledge even before the exposes of 1967 that there had been labor programs.

Persons in international labor affairs were dismayed, he said, over public disclosure of this CIA support. He said that "certain newspapers compounded their difficulties by confusing AID with CIA."

The summary continued, quoting the same speaker: "Since these disclosures, the turn of events has been unexpected. First, there hasn't been any real trouble with international labor programs. Indeed, there has been an increase in demand for U.S. labor programs and the strain on our capacity has been embarrassing. Formerly these common labor unions knew we were short of funds, but now they all assume we have secret CIA money, and they ask for more help."

Citing labor union in British Guiana as an example, he said they were "supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before."

In the summary of Bissell's presentation, the report said the United States should make increasing use of persons other than American citizens who "should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff."

"The desirability of more effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia and Africa, where the conduct of United States nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and circumscribed," the summary

said. Bissell was reported to have suggested that the CIA could use foreign nationals increasingly as "career agents," with a status midway between a classical agent in a single operation and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations.

At another point, the account of Bissell's presentation asked the question "From whom is a covert operation to be kept secret?"

"After five days, for example, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians, but these operations remained highly secret in the United States and with good reason," the summary said.

"If these overflights had 'leaked' to the American press, the USSR would have been forced to take action."

"On a less severe level, the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public of both sides. Unfortunately, there aren't enough of these situations."

Returning to covert financing of private organizations overseas, Bissell said that such pro-

continued

# After 1967 expose CIA sought new ties with campus, labor

By Crocker Snow Jr.  
Globe Staff

The written report of a confidential discussion about Central Intelligence Agency operations held in 1968, a year after the public controversy over agency involvement with the National Student Assn., shows the CIA was anxious to establish new contacts with other student groups, foundations, universities, labor organizations and corporations for its overseas work.

The discussion was held in January 1968 among ranking government officials and former officials, including several former CIA officers, under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Though no direct quotes are attributed in the report, the opinion was stated by the discussion leader, Richard M. Bissell Jr., formerly a deputy director of the CIA, that: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though these relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected."

The discussion also referred to the continued utility of labor groups and American corporations to CIA operations. No such groups or corporations are named.

The written report, like others sponsored by the council, is considered by the participants as "confidential" and "completely off the record."

The document is being circulated by the Africa Research Group, a small, radically oriented organization headquartered in Cambridge, because "it offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations."

Portions of the document are scheduled to appear today in the "University Review," a New York City-based monthly.

The document reflects individual assessments of the CIA by those present. The report includes a number of general statements:

--The two elements of CIA activity, "intelligence collection" and "covert action" (or "intervention") are not separated within the agency but are considered to "overlap and interact."

--The focus of classical espionage in Europe and other developed parts of the world had shifted "toward targets in the underdeveloped world."

--Due to the clear jurisdictional boundary between the CIA and FBI, the intelligence agency was "adverse to surveillance of US citizens overseas (even when specifically requested) and adverse to operating against targets in the United States, except for foreigners here as transients."

--The acquisition of a secret speech by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in February 1956 was a classic example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence. The State Department released the text which, according to one participant, prompted "the beginning of the split in the Communist movement." Since this speech had been specifically targeted before acquired, the results meant to this participant that "if you get a precise target and go after it, you can change history."

--"Penetration," by establishing personal relationships with individuals rather than simply hiring them, was regarded as especially useful in the underdeveloped world. The statement is made that "covert intervention (in the underdeveloped world) is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with a fairly short-term objective."

--The reconnaissance of

during the '50s provided "limited but dramatic results." flights were late of the cancelled scheduled summit between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev after Francis G. Powers was shot down in Laos.)

"After five days flights were from the Russian these operation highly secret in the States, and will soon," reads the these overflight 'leaked' to the press, the US have been forced action."

The meeting, was not to consider CIA missions so characterize general concepts and protect discussion was part of a council statement "Intelligence as Policy."

The chairman of the meeting was William D. Sullivan, an inveterate banker who had served in Washington as undersecretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy Administration.

Twenty persons were listed as attending including prominent former officials and educators like Harry Howe Ransome of Vanderbilt University and David B. Truman, president of Mt. Holyoke College.

The list included Allen Dulles, former director of the CIA, and Robert Amory Jr., who had been deputy director, as well as Bissell, who had been deputy director until shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, in which the CIA was involved.

The discussion took place just a year after revelations by Ramparts Magazine concerning CIA-funded training of agents for South Vietnam at

The document includes the statement that "it is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor and cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the agency's objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective."

In an article in the Saturday Evening Post in May 1967, Thomas Braden, who had helped set up the subsidies with Dulles, defended the concept as a way to combat the seven major front organizations of the Communist world in which the Russians through the use of their international fronts had stolen the great words such as peace, justice and freedom."

The report shows that the publicity had not been as damaging to CIA activities

# A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was 'off the record', the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."  
—C. Douglas Dillon

## By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etats consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements

rivalries, to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group which will pub-

This document may contain few of the startling disclosures found in the Pentagon Papers, but it does offer some insights which put those papers in a broader context.

"Intelligence and Foreign Policy" is the text of the minutes of a "confidential discussion group" which met in 1967-1968 under the aegis of the powerful and influential Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Widely known as a key center of foreign policy formulation, the Council literally is where the elite meet. It is here that corporation presidents and top bankers confer with government officials, leading academicians and foreign dignitaries. Currently headed by Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller, the Council publishes books, supports the work of Establishment scholars (Henry Kissinger is one of their prominent alumni), and enables the country's opinionmakers to brief each other on the state of their multinational interests. Even by Council standards, its sessions on Intelligence operations were extraordinary. Though compiled in 1968 this document from one of those meetings offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

\*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

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officiate. The accompanying "Who's Who" of the participants offers some details about the well-regarded positions these "leaders" hold in the Established order. In this discussion digest — only one of a still secret series — these power brokers get down to the nitty gritty issues that confront their world. Contrast, if you will, the precision of their concerns with the popular images of intelligence work.

In the mass media, the CIA has been so over identified with the James Bond-Mission Impossible image (perhaps not undeliberately) that it is difficult to appreciate the full range of its daily mundane work and power. On the left the tendency to associate the CIA only with coups and intrigue also mystifies its role as an administrator of complex political and economic institutions. Coups and assassinations are certainly within the organization's purview, but so is the task of orchestrating the intelligence-diplomatic-corporate-military-foreign aid-penetration of undeveloped countries by the U.S. "Overturning a regime is the easy part of political engineering," writes Richard Cottam, a political scientist privy to CIA operations. "Creating a stable and ideologically compatible regime is infinitely more complex..." In Vietnam, that strategy of shoring up a "compatible regime" has been called "Vietnamization." Elsewhere in the world, it is known as Neo-Colonialism.

As a strategy, neo-colonialism is failing in Vietnam largely because of resistance by a well-organized peoples' army. Of all the government agencies, the CIA appears to have understood that best, and consequently is viewed as a sober counterbalance to the military solutions so ineffectively attempted by the Generals. Elsewhere in the world revolutionary movements are not as advanced or as experienced as the Vietnamese. It is the CIA's mission to keep them that way. This objective underlies Mr. Bissell's enumeration of the ways the U.S. attempts to understand and influence any given country's "internal power balance." His is a program for grooming agents and allies in a way that makes them interdependent and ultimately indistinguishable.

These strategies are designed by an apparatus with immense resources at its disposal. A top-secret budget — esti-

several billion annually — permits the CIA to maintain a staff of at least 15,000 Americans along with several thousand non-American agents. At least half of its analysts and researchers have advanced degrees; a third hold doctorates. What the CIA does not know, it can find out through its links with universities, U.S. corporations, and other institutions.

The CIA monitors and indexes most major ongoing scientific and academic research with the aid of a specially designed data processing system. At least half of its daily "intelligence input" comes from open sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio monitoring, specialized journals, etc. Another 35 per cent is collected through various electronic devices, ranging from bugs to satellites; and the remaining fifteen per cent from agents in the field. This vast and well financed research nexus has its tentacles in virtually every sector of a nation's life: its schools, its media, its unions, its social organizations, and its political institutions.

Why does the United States require such an apparatus? Mr. Bisell doesn't really deal with this question, nor for that matter do the house experts who drafted the Pentagon Papers. The technocrats who serve American power are never ones to raise fundamental questions about the interests served by their global strategies. Unhappily, the periodic clamor for "controlling" the CIA also usually avoids any of the more basic questions about the covert character of American intervention. The latest such reform effort underway is a bill introduced by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would force the CIA to share its analyses and projection with Congress. In offering their tentative approval, the editors of the liberal Washington Post admitted bluntly that the measure does not regard the CIA as an "ominous operational agency whose work must be checked". With enemies like this the CIA needs few friends.

The CIA clearly is an operational agency: it has established itself plainly on the beaches of Cuba, in the continuing heroin traffic of Indochina, and in its role in the murders of Che Guevara and Patrice Lumumba, just to mention

Through out the world, revolutionary movements know they must "check" CIA dirtywork if they are to win back their countries from elites now dependent on foreign interests. In this country, the repressive apparatus is not only swelling but increasingly equipping itself with the sophisticated gadgetry long associated with counterinsurgency and foreign spying. CIA Director richard Helms has even been publically mentioned as a possible successor to the FBI's aging J. Edgar Hoover. Those corporate liberals now aboard the anti-FBI bandwagon would like nothing more than to see the FBI streamlined and professionalized along CIA lines. In other words the covert action strategies now in use abroad may very well get introduced — if they aren't already — in the domestic political arena.

It will be an uphill battle for U.S. citizens as well as the people of undeveloped countries to check the operations of the CIA. The first step is understanding the scope and purposes of its actions. This document, like the Pentagon Papers, adds to our understanding of how U.S. really conducts foreign policy. Its appearance, like the appearance of the Pentagon Papers, is certain to alarm the keepers of national insecurity. They will order the imperial barn doors closed and double-locked. But for this testament, it's too late. Too late. The horses of instruction and insurgency are running wild. Wild horses! And with apologies to Mr. Jagger and Company, these wild horses are going to drag this system away.



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# Government Network

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
As the American empire expanded in the post-war period, the U.S. government created and staffed an immense network for administering it. By one piece of legislation, the National Security Act of 1947, the various branches of the military, and new Air Force, were placed under a centralized Department of Defense with the power to draft in peacetime. The Act also formed the National Security Council (NSC) and gave unprecedented powers to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Together these well funded agencies erected the apparatus of the Empire: instruments for intelligence collection and military intervention that formed the backbone of America's heralded rise to the status of "World Power".

That power depends in no small part on the government's ability to know what people and other governments throughout the world are planning and doing. As the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations observed in a study on the "Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy," American policy abroad is "predominantly concerned with the internal affairs of other countries. ...there is no country in the world whose changing internal power structure is irrelevant to U.S. foreign policy." Keeping tabs on the internal political and economic situation in every country in the world is a vast and delicate enterprise. Its maintenance is essential for the ability to predict political events and covertly intervene when necessary on the Empire's behalf.

The Central Intelligence Agency performed the critical task of conceptualizing and coordinating the vast network of interlinked research and intelligence agencies. In 1969, the Federal government spent \$33.3 million for social and behavioral research on foreign areas and international affairs. In 1967, the same government agencies spent \$40.6 million in contracted research that drew on virtually every major academic center in the nation and many abroad. These millions are only a fraction of what it takes to keep the Intelligence and Defense Agencies alive. Moreover, each of these government complexes--the Defense agencies and the intelligence community--support secret research for which figures are not available.

The actual attention Africa receives from U.S. government-sponsored research is greater than the figures lead us to believe. In 1969, only 11% of all the government research funds allocated to out-house work (research not conducted in government agencies) was directly about Africa. But Africa cannot be isolated from the larger international context. American research on Europe, for example, has to consider Africa as well, and Africa's economic underdevelopment is often researched in the context of international economic and political problems. In this way, research about Africa is often hidden under different names.

The activities of U.S. Federal agencies clearly illustrate how an imperialist government collects and analyzes data about Africa to form its varied strategies of intervention. The scope of the research and action programs carried out by these agencies, which are coordinated with varying degrees of bureaucratic "efficiency", present a picture of formidable U.S. impact on Africa countries.



CIA

CIA headquarters, Langley, Va.: All the info's here.

The Central Intelligence Agency is not an "Invisible Government". It is an integrated part of an indivisible system. It plays a critical and central role in overseeing all government and private area research. The CIA had its hands in generating social science research about Africa in the United States and in creating American agencies which can covertly operate as extensions of American policy in Africa:

The CIA's own research program, staffed by approximately 30,000 employees, is the most extensive information gathering and evaluation program in the world. At least 80% of its research utilizes overt sources: eg., newspapers, radio-monitoring, research papers, and contacts with "private citizens." That material is fed into and retrieved by a highly advanced automated computer system, especially developed for this use by IBM. That computer is able to deal with 200,000 such open sources every month.

The CIA has on its staff more Ph.D.'s than several major universities combined, and far more than any other government agency. Its role in social science research has never been publicly revealed, although it is known that many contracts go through the External Research Division of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is now headed by Ray Cline, a past deputy director of "the Agency".

The CIA's information gathering intelligence activities are paralleled by its cloak and dagger type activities. These include electronic espionage, reconnaissance (U-2 planes) and spy networks. The CIA's covert action program aims to be able to manipulate the internal political situation in any "target" country. Such manipulation could include assassinations, coups, and even para-military operations aimed at containing revolutionary efforts. In a more "positive" situation, the CIA often is directly involved in advising chiefs of state, shaping local institutions, or managing a country's economic development program. The CIA's program of subsidies to various "non-profit" organizations is central to this strategy.

In most countries, the CIA bases its activities in the American Embassy and places them under the minimal control of the local Ambassador. CIA personnel, often political officers in the Embassy, are integrated into the coordinated "multi-agency country-team", often in leadership positions. This means, quite simply, that the CIA often directs the overall thrust of U.S. penetration, seeking to fashion a "strategy of cumulative impact." Such a strategy aims at creating or reinforcing pro-western institutions which collectively shape a country's political and economic direction.

Continued

worked to rationalize foreign aid as a policy weapon. A network of organizations ---teachers, students, cultural program associations, trade unions, etc.--were founded or subsidized through various conduits. Many of these sought to co-opt important African leaders and act as non-official channels of American influence.

Many of the organizations active in Africa which have direct links to the CIA have been exposed in newspapers and magazines: African-American Institute (AAI), American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), Congress of Cultural Freedom, International Student Conference, World Assembly of Youth, Peace with Freedom, Inc., African American Labor Center. The CIA as well helped to organize the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, East African Publishing House, Jomo Kenyatta Educational Institute, Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, and Milton Obote Foundation. As a matter of caution, not conscience, the CIA has also had a hand in subsidizing African liberation movements, or splinters from such movements. CIA money has helped finance nationalist parties or back individual African politicians friendly to the United States. Some of the organizations once funded by the CIA folded when their links were exposed; others have had their funding picked up by the Ford Foundation or other national and international agencies. In many cases, individuals oozed from a CIA payroll to a Foundation payroll; in all cases, the source of the funding was less important than the nature of the task.

#### THE CIA AND AFRICAN STUDIES

It should not be surprising that it was the CIA which played the crucial role in stimulating interest in African affairs in the United States. In the late fifties, the political handwriting on the African wall was quite visible to Washington's super sleuths even if the State Department seemed blinded by its racist loyalty to its British and French allies. In 1954, it was the CIA that put the African American Institute on a solid financial footing, in close cooperation with the American Metal Climax Corporation, the African mining concern whose Chairman became the AAI's big angel. In that year, when Boston University launched its own African Studies program, William O. Brown left the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence to head it up. As the nation's chief central intelligence agency, the CIA understood that generating information and contacts in Africa was a priority if the U.S. was to be assured access to the Continent's "emerging" political leaders and economic resources.

In late 1956, Max Millikan, the economist who took a leave of absence from M.I.T. to become a deputy director of the CIA, and then returned to direct that university's CIA-subsidized Center for International Affairs, invited a former State Department employee Arnold Rivkin to develop and direct an African Research Program at M.I.T. Rivkin worked out a "suitable research" design with fellow professor, Walt Rostow, an intelligence officer and close advisor to Lyndon Baines Johnson, now in exile with that war criminal in Texas. Rivkin's assignment was to forge policy proposals within the context of a broader "free world" framework. Standard procedure at the M.I.T. center at that time was the practice of publishing books in two versions, one classified for circulation within the intelligence community, the other "sanitized" for public consumption.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

While the CIA was "inspiring" university African Affairs programs, it was also getting its own African Intelligence division organized. In August, 1958, the Committee of Africanists selected by the Ford Foundation to "survey the present condition and future prospects of African Studies" had a rare direct interview with the CIA to assess its need for personnel. According to their report, the Agency said it would need "a constant staff level of something like 70 people specializing in the African area; they particularly desire those who have training in economics, geography, or political science. They are, however, prepared to train a man if they can get a person whom they feel is suitable for their type of work." Their type of work, indeed! The CIA still recruits for new personnel on the campuses (see the enclosed ad if you are looking for a job!). The State Department, interestingly, only projected a need for fifty officers over the next 10 years. By 1961, according to State Department Advisor Vernon McKay, "the professional staff of the Africa office declined from twenty-three to fifteen when certain long range research activities were transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency" (Africa in World Politics p. 296).

The CIA continues to shape and monitor all government sponsored research on Africa through its participation in the Foreign Area Coordination Group and its close links with the State Department Intelligence Agency. It has access to all other academic output through the willing cooperation of many scholars -- who register their work with the State Department--or through close and overlapping ties with such agencies as the Ford Foundation and its academic front committees. As well, many individual scholars have ties with the CIA or its front groups. L. Gray Cowan, for example, the 1969-1970 President of the African Studies Association, was known to have liaisons with one Willard Mathias, a high-level CIA functionary. Mathias was a visiting fellow in 1958-1959 at Harvard's Center of International Affairs. His topic of study: Africa, of course. Cowan has also been a long time member of the African-American Institute's Board of Directors. And on and on.

The close ties between the CIA and so many African Studies programs suggests more than the insidiousness of the former or the submissiveness of the latter. What emerges is more of a symbiotic relationship; a game in which the players wear different uniforms but play by the same rules. LOOK editor William Attwood, the one time ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, inadvertently offered some clues about the CIA's attractiveness to many scholars in his memoirs, The Reds and Blacks. On his return to the U.S., Attwood recalls, "I put in long hours answering questions for roomfuls of people at CIA (pipes, casual sports jackets, and yellow pads) and State (cigarettes, dark suits and white notebooks)". Academics prefer those pipes and yellow pads every time.

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The Africa Research Group is a movement research and education project that focuses on analyzing the United States' imperialist penetration of Africa. The group hopes to promote a more informed concern with and protest against the role the US plays in the domination of Africa and to contribute to sharpening and extending an anti-imperialist and anti-racist consciousness within movements for social change. The group wants to hear from people or organizations with similar research interests. For a list of available publications including "Armed Struggle in Southern Africa" (20c) and "How Harvard Rules" (\$1), write P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138,

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easy. —Nathan M. Pusey

# HOW HARVARD RULES

Being a total critique of Harvard  
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